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I. INTRODUCTION 
In its opening brief, the Idaho Department of Transportation ("Department") presented the 
relevant facts. Those facts are incorporated herein by this reference. In sum, the Appellee, Susan Jane 
Warner ("Warner"), committed a DUI in Idaho in 2012, and then a second DUI in Montana less than 
two years later. The Department suspended her license for one year upon notification of her second 
DUL The district court reversed that decision and imposed a suspension for only thirty days. 
Warner argues that the Department treated her differently solely because her DUI conviction 
occurred in another jurisdiction. She argues that Idaho is bound by the form of the Montana DUI 
conviction and punishment, and cannot impose a license suspension greater than that allowed for a first 
offense DUI because that comprised the substance of her punishment in Montana. Warner also argues 
that an application of the Idaho statutes resulting in a one-year suspension would violate two 
constitutional rights. 
However, Warner is attempting to exploit the differences between Montana and Idaho DUI laws 
to do exactly what she accuses the Department of doing-obtain different treatment solely because her 
second DUI was in Montana and not in Idaho. Additionally, Warner fails to demonstrate how a one-
year license suspension for a DUI infringes on any of her constitutional rights. 
II. LAW AND ARGUMENT 
The Idaho statues governing administrative license suspensions are to ensure that drivers have 
their licenses suspended for specified periods of time each time they commit a DUL The legislature has 
tried to cover each possible angle for that purpose, mandating automatic license suspensions upon 
failing a BAC test in Idaho (Idaho Code § 18-8002A), mandating a license suspension upon the 
conviction of a DUI in Idaho (Idaho Code § 18-8005), mandating an administrative license suspension 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- 3 
when an Idaho court fails to impose the proper license suspension (Idaho Code § 49-326(a)), and 
mandating an administrative license suspension when a driver commits a DUI in another jurisdiction 
(Idaho Code § § 49-3 24, 4 9-3 26(1 )( e) )-which happens to be the issue in this case. 
Idaho Code section 49-324 states, in part: 
The department shall suspend, disquaiify or revoke the driver's license or privilege of 
any resident of this state or the privilege of a nonresident to operate a motor vehicle in 
this state upon receiving notice of the conviction, administrative action or court order 
of that person in another state or jurisdiction of an offense which, if committed in this 
state, would be grounds for the suspension, disqualification or revocation of the 
driver's license and privileges of the driver. 
(Emphasis added). Similarly, Idaho Code section 49-326(1 )( e) states that if a court has not suspended a 
driver's license, the Department must suspend that license if the driver, "[h]as committed an offense in 
another state or jurisdiction as evidenced by a conviction, court order or administrative action, which if 
committed in Idaho would be grounds for suspension, disqualification or revocation" of the license. 
(Emphasis added). 1 
These statutes operate alongside the other license suspension statutes to bring uniformity to all 
and to ensure all Idaho-licensed drivers are subject to the same driving privilege consequences for 
drinking and driving. These statutes do not violate the Equal Protection Clause or the right to travel as 
they bring uniformity to all regardless of where the DUI offense is committed. 
A. IDAHO CODE SECTIONS 49-324 AND 49-326 DO NOT OPERATE TO TREAT 
PEOPLE DIFFERENTLY, BUT TO BRING UNIFORMITY TO ALL-IN-STATE 
OFFENDERS AND OUT-OF-STATE OFFENDERS. 
Warner argues that, even though her Montana DUI was her second DUI, she can only be subject 
1 In this case, the underlying ground for suspension is Idaho Code section 18-8005, which provides that for a DUI, a 
license is to be suspended for 30 days absolute, followed by 60 days with restrictions. An enhancement in that statute 
is if the driver has at least one other DUI in the past IO years in which case, if there is only one other DUI, the 
suspension is for one-year absolute. 
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to an Idaho license suspension for a first offense DUI because she was not convicted of a second 
offense DUI inMontana.2 Warner's position misunderstands the role of the foreign convictions in the 
Idaho administrative license suspension statutes and is an attempt to exploit the differences between 
Idaho DUI statutes and Montana DUI statutes to her advantage, thereby thwarting the intentional 
uniformity underlying the license suspension statutes. 
In its opening brief, the Department noted that Idaho Code sections 49-324 and 49-326(1 )(e) 
direct the Department to focus on whether the offense of a DUI was committed in another jurisdiction, 
and does not direct the Department to pay attention to how the foreign jurisdiction punishes that DUL 
Both Idaho Code sections 49-324 and 49-326(1 )( e) are very clear in this regard-the Department looks 
at the foreign "conviction, court order, or administrative action" as evidence that an "offense" has been 
committed. In DUI cases, the "offense" is the DUI itself, not the enhancement available for the number 
DUI it happens to be. See State v. Schall, 157 Idaho 488,493, 337P.3d 647,652 (2014) (the offense at 
issue is the violation ofldaho Code section 18-8004 [DUI] and that very offense may be charged either 
as a misdemeanor or a felony depending upon the defendant's prior criminal history."). 
The purpose for the emphasis on the "offense" and not the form of the conviction is so that all 
Idaho-licensed drivers are treated equally-in-state and out-of-state-even when foreign jurisdictions 
have differing DUI laws. For example, as previously noted by the Department, Idaho counts all DUis, 
regardless of jurisdiction, when calculating the number ofDUis for punishment purposes. See Idaho 
Code Section 18-8005(4) ('Any person who pleads guilty or is found guilty of a violation of the 
provisions of section 18-8004(1)(a), (b) or (c), Idaho Code, who previously has been found guilty of or 
has pled guilty to a violation of the provisions of section 18-8004(1)(a), (b) or (c), Idaho Code, or any 
2 Warner continues to reference her Montana DUI as a "first offense DUI." Resp. Brief, p. 7. That is inaccurate. Her 
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substantially conforming foreign criminal violation withln ten (10) years ... "). However, Montana does 
not count foreign jurisdiction DUis when determining the punishment enhancement for a DUL See 
Montana Code Annotated ("MCA") § 61-8-714(2)( a) ("a person convicted of a second violation of 61-
8-401 ... ); MCA§ 61-8-401 ( declaring it unlawful to operate a motor vehlcle while under the influence 
of alcohol "upon the way of this state [Montana] open to the public"). Therefore, while Warner's 
Montana DUI would be punished as a second DUI had it been committed in thls state, it could not be 
punished as a second DUI in Montana because her first DUI was not committed in Montana. Warner 
seeks unequal treatment-to her benefit-because her second DUI occurred in a foreign jurisdiction. 
Interpretations that provide drivers a "free bite," such as the one Warner is attempting to obtain, 
are contrary to the purpose of the license suspension statutes and are not supported by Idaho appellate 
courts. In In re Bowman, 135 Idaho 843,844, 25 P.3d 866,867 (Ct. App. 2001). a driver was arrested 
for a DUI and submitted a blood test. Approximately one month later, before the blood test results were 
received, the driver was again arrested for a DUI but thls time provided a breath test. Id. Having failed 
the breath test, the Department immediately suspended his driver's license for ninety days. Id. When 
the blood test results were completed, showing that the driver's BAC from the first arrest was .19, the 
Department issued a notice that the driver's suspension would be for one year. Id. After the driver 
unsuccessfully challenged the suspension at a hearing, the district court reversed the one-year 
suspension for a second DUI and implemented the suspension for a first DUI. Id. The Department 
appealed. Id. 
The issue on appeal was the interpretation of the phrase, "failure of evidentiary testing." Id. at 
845, 25 P.3d at 868. The Court of Appeals held that "evidentiary testing refers to the completed series 
Montana DUI was an "Aggravated DUI." R. at 22. 
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of procedures" to determine the BAC and therefore the driver had not failed the evidentiary testing until 
the testing was completed. Id. at 846, 25 P.3d at 869. After interpreting the statute, the Court stated, 
"Both test results indicated that Bowman had been driving on two separate occasions while his blood-
alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit" and that the driver's one-year license suspension was 
proper, reversing the district court. Id. After ruiing, the Court noted that its interpretation of the statute 
"complies with the legislative purpose underlying the administrative license suspension 
statute ... [ which is] to provide maximum safety for all persons using the highways" by revoking the 
licenses of intoxicated drivers. Id. The Court observed that the driver's interpretation of the statute 
"would allow a person to avoid a one-year suspension although alcohol concentration tests indicate that 
the person was driving under the influence on two separate occasions within a five-year period." Id. at 
847, 25 P.3d at 870. The Court stated that such a "free bite" "would contradict the legislative purpose 
underlying" the administrative license suspensions. Id. 
The concern over DUI offenders exploiting the differences in DUl laws between jurisdictions in 
order to obtain a "free bite" is precisely why the legislature instructs the Department to focus on the 
"offense" and not the form of the conviction or the punishment foreign jurisdictions impose. The 
legislature was exhibiting awareness or foresight that other jurisdictions may not calculate prior DUis 
the same as Idaho. Thus, in order to maintain uniformity between those who offend in Idaho and those 
who offend in other jurisdictions, the legislature instructs the Department in Idaho Code sections 49-
324 and 49-326(l)(e) to look at the offense and apply the suspension as though the offense was 
committed in this state without regard as to how other jurisdictions choose to punish those offenses. 
That is precisely what the Department did in Warner's case. Had she committed her Montana DUI in 
Idaho, she would be subject to a one-year suspension. However, if the Department was limited to the 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- 7 
form of the Montana conviction, where Warner could not be punished for a second DUI, then Warner 
would get the "free bite" that the legislature and Idaho appellate courts have refused to permit. In 
theory, and assuming that all other 49 states have DUI laws mirroring Montana's, such a "free bite" 
interpretation could result in Warner being able to commit 50 DUis in 50 different states within a ten-
year period without having her Idaho license suspended for one year at a single time. 
In furtherance of the legislature's goal to bring uniformity to license suspensions, the legislature 
has directed the Department to suspend licenses in civil proceedings. The Idaho Court of Appeals has 
recognized the nature of an administrative license suspension, stating such "is a civil penalty separate 
and apart from any other suspension imposed for a violation of other Idaho motor vehicle codes or 
for a conviction of an offense." Id. at 845, 25 P.3d at 868. Notwithstanding this fact, Warner attempts 
to remove this case from the civil arena by relying on State v. Halford, 124 Idaho 411, 860 P .2d 27 
(Ct. App. 1993). In Halford, a criminal defendant was charged and pled guilty to a DUL Id. at 412, 
860 P.2d at 28. Despite any mention in the criminal complaint that this DUI charged should be 
"enhanced" due to prior DUis, the court issued an "enhanced" criminal punishment for the DUL Id. 
The defendant appealed, arguing that he could not be subjected to the "enhanced" penalties because 
he did not plead guilty to the enhancement. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed, determining that the 
court's sentence, "which exceed[ ed] the maximum incarceration, fine and license suspension for an 
unenhanced misdemeanor DUI [was] contrary to law." Id. at 414, 860 P.2d at 30. 
Unlike Halford, this case involves a civil remedy to protect drivers on Idaho roads and not a 
criminal punishment. Where in a criminal case courts are bound by the form of the complaint for the 
offenses and enhancements charged, the Department is not so restricted by the form of a foreign 
judgment when identifying and evaluating offenses committed in other jurisdictions in order to 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- 8 
determine the proper suspension as though those offenses were committed in this state. This case 
does not present an issue of exceeding criminal sentencing maximums, but addresses the appropriate 
civil license suspension for a driver who committed her second DUI in a foreign state-a state that, 
unlike Idaho, does not recognize her first DUI. To bind this civil case to a criminal case and the 
doctrines applied therein would effectively can into question the principle that administrative license 
suspensions are civil remedies "separate and apart from any other suspension imposed for a violation 
of other Idaho motor vehicle codes for a conviction of an offense" (Bowman, 135 Idaho at 845, 25 
P.3d at 868), and run contrary to the Idaho Court of Appeals' more recent observation that "Idaho 
appellate courts have not viewed driver's license suspensions as punishment." Buell v. Idaho Dept. of 
Transp., 151 Idaho 257,263,254 P.3d 1253, 1259 (2011). 
The administrative license suspension statutes were enacted to provide "safety for all persons 
using the highways of this state by quickly revoking the driving privileges of those persons who have 
shown themselves to be safety hazards by driving" under the influence. State v. Talavera, 127 Idaho 
700, 705, 905 P.2d 633, 638 (1995). The legislature authorized the Department to immediately revoke 
licenses of those who fail evidentiary tests in Idaho, those who are convicted of a DUI in Idaho but do 
not have their licenses suspended, and to suspend the licenses of those who commit DUis in foreign 
jurisdictions in an obvious attempt to ensure that no Idaho-licensed person committing a DUI would 
slip through the cracks. Contrary to the purpose and intent of the administrative license suspension 
statutes, Warner is attempting to exploitthe differences between Montana's DUI laws and Idaho's DUI 
laws so that she can evade the suspension she would have received had she committed the Montana 
DUI offense in Idaho. Warner's attempt is contrary to the purpose and language of the administrative 
license suspension statutes. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- 9 
B. A ONE-YEAR SUSPENSION DOES NOT VIOLATE WARNER'S CONSTITUIONAL 
RIGHTS. 
Warner additionally argues that a one-year license suspension for her Montana DUI violates her 
Constitutional rights as she is being treated differently for her Montana conviction than a person in 
Idaho with an identical conviction. Her Constitutional arguments are insupportable because she has not 
been treated differently than those who have their second DUis in Idaho and her right to travel is not 
infringed by suspending her license after she commits a DUI offense. 
1. Warner has not demonstrated a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
Warner claims that the one-year license suspension would violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
However, Warner fails to demonstrate that she is being treated any differently than a person who 
commits his or her second DUI in Idaho. 
An equal protection violation claim requires, at a minimum, 1) an identified classification, 2) 
the standard upon which the classification will be reviewed. State v. Rogerson, 132 Idaho 53, 56-57, 
966 P.2d 53, 56-57 (Ct. App. 1998). It appears that Warner is arguing that her classification would be 
those who are convicted ofDUis in foreign jurisdictions. 
As noted above, the claim of unequal treatment based upon this classification is false. In Idaho, 
a person who commits a second DUI within ten years is subject to the consequences of a second DUI, 
which includes receiving a one-year license suspension, regardless of whether the first DUI was in 
Idaho or another jurisdiction. However, a person who commits a second DUI in Montana when the first 
DUI was in a foreign jurisdiction is not subject to the consequences of a second DUL Therefore, when 
applying Idaho Code sections 49-324 and 49-326(1 )( e ), as they relate to section 18-8005, a first DUI 
offender in Montana is not necessarily the same as a first DUI offender in Idaho and cannot be 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- 10 
compared for purposes of establishing whether unequal treatment has occurred. 
Even if Montana's DUI laws mirrored Idaho's, the imposition of a one-year suspension when 
Montana chooses to charge the second DUI as a first DUI still does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause. Courts apply three potential standards of review for equal protection violation analysis: 1) strict 
scrutiny for suspect classifications such as those based upon race, 2) intermediate scrutiny for those 
cases where "the state action in question creates obviously and invidiously discriminatory 
classifications," and 3) rational basis test where "a classification will be upheld if it is rationally related 
to a legitimate government objective." Id. The claim of unequal treatment is not based upon a suspect 
classification, nor is it an obviously discriminatory classification. Therefore, the constitutional test to 
apply is whether using foreign judgments solely for the purpose of evidencing a DUI occurred-
without regard to the punishment enforced by that foreign jurisdiction-is rationally related to a 
legitimate government objective. 
This case demonstrates the government objective and its legitimacy in this alleged unequal 
treatment. Idaho issues and controls Idaho driving privileges. Idaho has a strong public interest in 
protecting Idaho's roads from those who choose to drink and drive and regulating its Idaho-issued 
driving privileges. By not limiting the Department's purview to the punishment applied in a foreign 
conviction, the Idaho legislature demonstrates its desire to be the one who determines the length of 
suspension for Idaho-issued driving privileges instead ofleaving it to the whim of a foreign jurisdiction. 
To limit Idaho and its ability to extend driving privileges and protect the drivers on its own highways to 
the decisions of foreign jurisdictions based upon their own laws and interests in cases where Idaho has 
no input or decision-making ability is illogical. 
An illustration is appropriate to demonstrate this legitimate government objective. Assuming 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- 11 
that Montana and Idaho's laws are the same and Warner commits her second DUI. If that DUI is 
committed in Idaho, she is prosecuted by the State ofldaho and the State ofldaho determines whether it 
is in this State's best interests to proceed with a DUI or an enhanced DUL Therefore, in this scenario, 
Idaho makes the decisions about the charged enhancement, and consequently what will happen with 
Warner's Idaho-issued driving privileges. However, if Warner's second DUI is in Montana, then Idaho 
has no say about whether an enhancement is charged or not, even though an enhancement is 
appropriate. If the Department was forced to apply the suspension that fit the form of Montana's chosen 
punishment, then Idaho, the safety of its roads and the control ofits driving privileges, would be at the 
mercy of Montana's decisions and prosecutorial discretion. Therefore, looking at the judgment of 
conviction from the other jurisdiction solely for the purpose to determine the offense-as opposed to 
being limited to the foreign punishment-allows Idaho to maintain control over its interests of 
protecting Idaho roads and regulating Idaho-issued driving privileges. 
Warner has not demonstrated unequal treatment. She benefitted from the differences in laws 
between Idaho and Montana to avoid the second DUI enhancement in her criminal conviction. 
However, had she committed the same offense in Idaho-which is the standard under Idaho Code 
sections 49-3 24 and 49-326(1 )( e )-she would be subject to a second DUI enhancement and, therefore 
no unequal treatment is found. Additionally, the focus on the offense and not the conviction is 
rationally related to the legitimate interest of allowing Idaho to decide, independent of the decisions of 
foreign jurisdictions, how to protect its own roads and regulate Idaho-issued driving privileges. 
2. Warner has not demonstrated a violation of her right to travel. 
Warner has also alleged a violation to her right to travel. Although Warner's exact position is 
unclear, it appears that Warner is arguing that ifldaho counts how many DUis an Idaho-licensed driver 
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has when suspending a license based upon a DUI committed in another state, Warner's ability to drink 
and drive in another state is impinged. Such an argument is nonsensical. 
The "right to travel" discussed in our cases embraces at least three different 
components. It protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another 
State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when 
temporarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become 
permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State. 
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500, (1999). The "right to travel" encapsulates the "right of free ingress 
and regress to and from neighboring states .... " Id. (internal quotes omitted). 
Reviewing Warner's argument, it is unclear how Idaho's treatment of foreign DUis with 
regards to Idaho's driving privileges affects a driver's ability to enter and leave foreign states. If 
consequences to crimes were sufficient reason to violate the right to travel, then all criminal laws 
would have to be uniform among the states or else a violation of the right to travel would occur any 
time a person commits a crime in one state that is punished more harshly than the same crime in 
another state. 
Examples of right to travel violation challenges demonstrate that Idaho's suspension of 
Warner's license following her second DUI is not a violation of her right to travel. The Supreme 
Court of the United States determined that a state's welfare scheme that treated new Californian 
residents different was a violation of this right. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). In Gordon v. 
State, 108 Idaho 178,697 P.2d 1192 (Ct. App. 1985), the Court of Appeals ofldaho determined that 
the laws requiring a vehicle operator to be licensed, register his vehicle, and carry insurance coverage 
did not violate the right to travel. In Gordon, the Court of Appeals recognized a sister jurisdiction's 
observation that "[t]he exercise of [the right to travel] the city may, under its police power, regulate 
in the interest of the public safety and welfare ... " Id. at 180,697 P.2d at 1194. In another case, the 
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Supreme Court ofldaho determined that a court order stripping a custodial parent's custody if she 
moved out of Idaho did implicate the parent's right to travel, but that such restriction was necessary 
to serve a compelling government interest-that the best interests of the children be effectuated. 
Bartosz v. Jones, 146 Idaho 449, 462-63, 197 P.3d 310, 323-24 (2008). 
Perhaps most similar to this case is State v. Yeoman, i 49 Idaho 505,236 P.3d 1265 (20i 0). In 
Yeoman, a criminal defendant was convicted of rape in Washington in 1984 and required to register 
as a sex offender. Id. at 506,236 P.3d at 1266. He moved to Idaho in 2007. Id. He was subsequently 
charged for failing to register as a sex offender. Id. After his conviction, he appealed. Id. The issues 
on appeal involved the interpretation ofldaho Code sections 18-8301 to 18-8326, which were the 
Idaho sex offender registration laws. Id. Specifically, the registration requirements in Idaho applied 
only to those applicable sex crimes that occurred on or after July 1, 1993, but in 2005 the legislature 
added an additional provision, requiring the registration of those offenders who committed sex 
crimes in foreign jurisdictions and would be required to register there as a sex offender. Id. 
The defendant argued that because his Washington sex crime occurred prior to July 1, 1993, 
it should not be counted for purposes of registering as a sex offender in Idaho. Id. The defendant 
argued that "the statute in question clearly treats an in-state sex offender differently than it would a 
similarly situated out-of-state sex offender" and that such violated his right to travel and the Equal 
Protection Clause. Id. at 508, 236 P.3d at 1268. The Court rejected this argument, finding that the 
statute did not implicate his right to travel because he would have to register as a sex offender in 
Washington but that if it did, it satisfied a "compelling state interest" because the state had a "strong 
interest in preventing future sexual offenses and alerting local law enforcement and citizens to the 
whereabouts of those that could reoffend." Id. at 508-09, 236 P.3d at 1268-69. 
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Similarly, Warner's right to travel is not infringed upon by a one-year suspension. Had 
Warner committed her second DUI in Idaho, she would have been subject to a one-year suspension 
just like any other Idaho-licensed driver who commits their second DUI in Idaho or out ofldaho. She 
is not entitled to a "free bite" just because she committed the second DUI in a jurisdiction that does 
not count her Idaho DUI. Additionaily, even if her license suspension implicated her right to travel, 
the one-year suspension satisfies a compelling government interest as Idaho has a strong interest in 
regulating those to whom it grants driving privileges and to keep drivers safe on Idaho roads. 
Application ofldaho's driver's license suspension statutes does not impinge on Warner's 
ability to travel to other states-it only impinges on her ability to drink and drive, which is not a 
protected right. Warner is free to visit other states. However, in order to keep her driver's license 
valid, she is not free to drink and drive in this state, or any other state that will prosecute her for a 
DUI offense. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the second time in less than two years, Warner operated a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol. The Hearing Officer correctly reviewed Warner's Montana conviction to ensure 
that Warner had committed a DUI in Montana, and then affirmed the civil one-year license suspension 
because Warner had a previous DUI. The Court should reverse the district court's decision and reinstate 
the license suspension. 
DATED this 1st day of February, 2016. 
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